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The threat posed by influenza pandemics raises serious ethical
issues, as well as questions of global health governance. In order to
create pre-pandemic vaccines, global health authorities need access to
virus from regional outbreaks. But because the countries where these
outbreaks occur are unlikely to benefit from the vaccine, they are
sometimes reluctant to share this seed stock, and may try to make
proprietary arrangements with pharmaceutical companies, as briefly
occurred in Indonesia. Although these arrangements may increase
developing countries' access to vaccine, they hamper the global
cooperation necessary to prepare for influenza outbreaks. Developing
countries, in contrast, point to the United States' decision not to use
adjuvants in influenza vaccines with the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, even
though this is common in Europe, and it might make tens of millions of
individual doses available for donation to developing countries. Similar
issues bedevil preparation efforts, particularly concerning advance
contracts for vaccines. This paper will examine a number of these
challenges, and the global health policies needed to address them,
based on Indonesia’s 2007 decision not to share viral samples with the
WHO, as well as events during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Influenza
Developing countries have long pointed to aspects of the World
Trade Organization (in particular the Trade Related Aspects of

3
Intellectual Property agreement), which they feel unfairly hamper
efforts to fight major epidemics. During the 1990s these disputes led to
a major struggle around providing generic drugs to people living with
HIV. This contest pitted the United States and pharmaceutical
companies, on the one hand, against developing countries and nongovernmental organizations, on the other. While this contest ended
with a victory for the Global South, more recently, issues of global
health equity have focused on influenza.
The influenza virus is a very contagious agent that causes a
respiratory disease. In the Northern hemisphere the flu season usually
begins in October and peaks around February. The opposite is true in
the Southern Hemisphere. For most people flu causes the rapid onset
of exhaustion, aches, headache, coughing and heaviness in their chest.
In most cases, with some time in bed and a little care, the flu quickly
passes. But flu is a highly mutagenic virus, which sometimes
undergoes major changes, in particular when a form adapted to birds
enters into humans or other animals. In this case, the world can see a
devastating pandemic.
The worst pandemic of the twentieth century struck in 1918,
when an avian form of the flu adapted to humans, and began to spread
rapidly, perhaps from Haskell County, Kansas. By the time that the
disease had run its course perhaps 40 million people had died, from
the hills of Northern India, the country most devastated by the disease,
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to the trenches of Western Europe during World War One.1 Many
famous people, such as Woodrow Wilson, may have been infected by
the disease, which also killed William Osler, the outstanding physician
of the age.2 As Alfred Crosby and Arno Karlen have argued, one of the
most unusual aspects of the pandemic is that it has been largely
forgotten.
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Significant influenza pandemics also swept the globe in 1957 and
1968, although neither caused the mortality of the 1918 outbreak. In
some respects, little has changed in the intervening decades. We do
have some treatments now for the flu. There are currently four drugs
used to treat influenza, which can only be obtained in most developing
countries with a prescription. All must be taken within a short period of
developing symptoms, and none cures the illness. Instead, they
shorten the course of the disease and alleviate suffering. Vaccines are
also available, but they currently represent an imperfect means to
address this threat. The flu virus mutates rapidly and there are many
different strains, each characterized by different proteins in their outer
1

Mike Davis. The monster at our door: The global threat of avian flu. (New
York: The New Press, 2005), 26, 32.

2

Barry, J.M. The great influenza: The epic story of the deadliest plague in
history. (New York: Penguin, 2005), 387.

3

Alfred Crosby, America’s forgotten pandemic: The influenza of 1918. (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Arno Karlen. Plague’s progress: A
social history of man and disease. (London: Victor Gollancz. 1995), 145.
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shell. Every year scientists scour the planet looking for different forms
of the virus. They then have to guess which forms will likely dominate
epidemics in the coming winter (for each hemisphere). They come to a
consensus on three different forms. It then takes months to grow the
virus in chicken eggs. One challenge is that vaccine designers
sometimes guess incorrectly, and a strain of virus will circulate widely
which is not covered by that year’s vaccine. Another risk is that a novel
form will appear for which the vaccine developers are completely
unprepared.
The current vaccine technology has other limitations, not the
least of which is that entails the use of millions of chicken eggs, which
are not only time consuming, but also could be difficult to obtain if a
bird flu pandemic wiped out chicken farms. Contamination can also be
a challenge, as proved the case in October 2004, when a plant owned
by Chiron in the United Kingdom produced a vaccine contaminated by
a bacteria. This one failure meant that the U.S. health system lost tens
of millions of expected doses of vaccine.4 The U.S. media asked how
the country could deal with pandemic flu, if it could not guarantee a
vaccine supply in a normal year? For this reason, as well as to shorten
the time entailed for vaccine preparation, there is currently a major
effort to create new vaccine technologies, which would no longer rely
on old egg-based approaches to production. Recent events have made
4

Davis, 140-144.
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this a high priority for the United States government, as well as other
global health actors.
Initially, global health officials focused on the threat from bird flu.
In 1997, an outbreak of bird flu in Hong Kong sickened eighteen people
and killed six. The government killed more than a million chickens in a
few days, which stamped out the outbreak.5 But this was not the only
appearance of bird flu. In February 2004, an outbreak of a different
strain of bird flu in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia caused the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency to order the destruction of nearly
twenty million chickens. In 2003 and 2004 bird flu again appeared in
South East Asia, particularly in Vietnam, and it has since spread to
countries as geographically distant as Turkey and Indonesia. Then in
2009 a new form of influenza, novel H1N1 (the so-called swine flu)
emerged in Mexico. In the end, the 2009 pandemic did not resemble
that of 1918. This was fortunate because in the northern hemisphere
most people did not have access to the vaccine until after the
epidemic had peaked.
Even before the 2009 pandemic, efforts to fight the flu raised key
moral questions. European and North American governments
collectively spent billions of dollars stockpiling medications, testing
vaccines, and encouraging basic research on the flu. At the same time,
developing nations struggling to contain bird flu found comparatively
5

Davis, 45-54.
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little aid forthcoming for tasks such as culling infected flocks. With the
emergence of H1N1, developed countries were able to activate preexisting contracts with major vaccine manufacturers, which gave their
countries first access to the vaccines produced. The manufacturers
would not take orders from poorer but more populous countries,
because they did not have the capacity. This inequality threatened
international efforts to contain flu pandemics.
Indonesia
Even before the emergence of novel H1N1, developing nations
proved reluctant to collaborate with First World nations to develop
possible vaccines, because they knew they were unlikely to benefit
from this research in the event of an outbreak. In some cases,
developing countries may have sought access to vaccines in the event
of an outbreak, by making deals with companies that could provide
vaccine in exchange for access to emerging viral strains. Indonesia, for
example, did not want to share strains of the bird flu collected from
fatalities because the country unless it was guaranteed access to any
vaccine developed from this resource:
In January, frustrated that an Indonesian strain of the virus
had been used to make a vaccine that most Indonesians
would not be able to afford, the country stopped
cooperating with the W.H.O. and made a deal to send
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samples to Baxter Healthcare, an American company, in
return for a low-cost vaccine and help in building vaccine
factories in Indonesia. Some other poor countries
applauded the move and debated whether to follow suit, a
move that could have set back global vaccine research.
Yesterday, Indonesia’s health minister, Siti Fadilah Supari,
told reporters in Jakarta that she would resume sending
samples to the W.H.O. “immediately.”6
In return, the W.H.O. agreed that it would not share its samples with
vaccine manufacturers. This deal, however, failed to end the conflict.
Supari soon returned to make even more serious accusations
against the United States, which shocked many observers: “Indonesian
health minister Siti Fadilah Supari, who is at the center of an
international controversy over (the) sharing of H5N1 avian influenza
samples, recently claimed that developed countries are creating new
viruses as a means of building new markets for vaccines, according to
an Agence France-Presse (AFP) report. In February, Supari published a
182 page book titled Time for the World to Change: God is Behind the
Avian Influenza Virus, which alleges that the United States intended to
produce a biological weapon with the H5N1 virus and the World Health
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McNeil Jr., D.G. (March 28, 2007). “Indonesia to send bird flu samples, with
restrictions.” New York Times. Accessed online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/28/world/asia/28birdflu.html?
_r1&oref=slogin@page2…; see also Elbe, 481.
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Organization (WHO) was conspiring to profit from H5N1 vaccines.”7
Supari may have been surprised by the attention the book attracted,
as “the English translation of the book was officially withdrawn by her
(due to what she claims were inaccuracies in translation).8 Indonesia
also threatened to close a key U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit that
engaged in surveillance of avian influenza, because it feared the
facility sought to weaponize bird flu.9 Stefan Elbe has suggested,
however, that her real concern may have been that this facility would
share viral samples with U.S. government agencies, which would
undermine Indonesia’s bargaining position both with the WHO and with
the developed world.10
As part of her argument, Supari had made arguments regarding
“viral sovereignty.” In this approach, viruses formed part of the
biological patrimony of the nations in which they were found, which
held exclusive rights to them. This idea attracted support amongst
developing countries, such as India, which viewed this approach as a
means to strengthen their bargaining position with the pharmaceutical
companies that provided vaccines. The Indonesian government itself

7

8

Schnirrer, L. (2008, September 8). Supari accuses rich nations of creating
viruses for profit. CIDRAP News, search the archive at www.umn.edu.

Elbe, 480.
Holbrooke, R. and L. Garrett. (2008), August 10. “`Sovereignty’ that risks
global health,” Washington Post, accessed online at
www.cfr.org/publication/16927. She continued to make this argument in 2009.
See Stefan Elbe, “Haggling over Viruses: the Downside Risks of Securitizing
Infectious Disease,” Health Policy and Planning, (2010) 25, p. 477.
10
Elbe, 482.
9
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was divided over this argument, but it attracted a powerful response in
the West.11 Laurie Garrett and Richard Holbroke published an article in
the Washington Post, to denounce this concept, which they argued
would undermine the kind of global cooperation required to face the
next influenza pandemic. The authors called on China to use its
influence with Indonesia, and for the United States to exercise
muscular diplomacy. The issue was particularly important because in
2007 Indonesia had reported the largest number of H5N1 cases in the
world, with a case fatality rate of 81%.12 Moreover, in 2007 it appeared
that the mortality rate from avian flu in influenza in Indonesia was
steadily increasing “from sixty-three percent in 2005 to eighty percent
in 2006 and nearly eighty-seen percent in 2007.” These figures, and
the fear that they created, did much to shape the ensuing debate.13
Supari’s conspiracy theories are nothing new to people who
study HIV. Similar stories appeared in Haiti in the 1980s, as people
accused the U.S. government of creating the virus to eliminate the
islands’ population. But it would be a mistake to associate Indonesia’s
concerns solely with these statements by the former minister of health.
Indeed, Indonesia’s President stated that in “Indonesia, we recognize
that there are issues to be resolved in the world health system, but
11

Elbe, 477.
Endang R. Seyaningsih, Siti Isfandari, Trioni Soendoro and Siti Fadilah Supari,
“Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The
Avian Case of Influenza.” Annals Academy of Medicine Singapore. 2008; 37: 482-8.
13
Kenan Mullis, “Playing Chicken with Bird Flu: `Viral Sovereignty,’ the Right to
Exploit Natural Genetic Resources, and the Potential Human Rights Ramifications,”
American University International Law Review, 24:943 (2009), 947-948.
12
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certainly we don’t believe in conspiracy theories.”14 While Supari’s
statements were outrageous, a broader set of concerns were neither
confined to Indonesia, nor mainly based on “conspiracy theories.”
Instead, they reflected the diverging interests of developed and
developing countries as they faced a potential pandemic. Indonesian
authors pointed out that the International Health Regulations, which
were revised in 2005, did not specifically state that nations had to
share biological samples.15 They complained that the results of studies
of these samples were being shared without information first being
provided to Indonesia. But they were most concerned that
pharmaceutical companies were developing vaccines using their seed
stocks without their permission, which finally provoked their decision
to stop cooperating with the WHO:
Toward the end of 2006, a call by a journalist to the
Indonesian MOH confirming news that an Australian
vaccine company’s plan to develop vaccine against H5N1
virus strain that Indonesia had provided to the WHO
system triggered Indonesia’s drastic action. The fact that
pharmaceutical companies had access to Indonesian
(vaccine seed) viruses that were shared with the WHO
affiliated laboratories was not only in violation (again) of
14

15

Lisa Schnirring, “Supari accuses rich nations of creating viruses for profit,”
CIDRAP, September 8, 2008, accessed on-line at
www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/
influenza/avianflu/news/sep0808indonisa.ia-br.htm.
Seyaningsih, et al., 484.
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the WHO guidance for virus sharing (March 2005), but also
–as strongly argued by Indonesia- revealed the unfairness
and inequities of the global system.16
The WHO recognized that this was a major issue, which extended
beyond the perceptions of one government official. The WHO sent
representatives to Indonesia in February, which had agreed in March to
resume sharing samples on a provisional basis, and by May of 2007 a
working group was formed to begin studying this problem. 17 But these
steps failed to resolve the dispute.
Despite the anger that Indonesia’s position created in developed
countries, the country could continue to count on international support.
In February 2007 the medical journal the Lancet published an editorial
in response to Indonesia’s declaration, which said that the WHO
needed to achieve an agreement that would demonstrate solidarity in
preparing for the next pandemic.18 Non-aligned nations also found
Indonesia’s argument to be attractive. In May of 2007 Indonesia raised
these questions at a meeting of the World Health Assembly. During
this meeting, developing countries launched a critique of how the
World Health Organization had shared viral seed stock samples:
In the course of these deliberations, it emerged that WHO
16

Sedyaningsih, et al., 486.
Seyaningsih, et al. 487.
18
For discussion of this issue see Chan Chee Khoon, “Equitable Access to Pandemic
Flu Vaccines,” a paper presented at the Conference on Strengthening Health and
Non-health Response Systems in Asia, March 18-19, 2010, Singapore. Accessed online from Third World Network” on January 28, 2011 at
www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/2010.health20100303htm.
17
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had not abided by the terms of the 2005 WHO guidelines
on sharing of viruses which required the consent of donor
countries before WHO’s collaborating centers could pass
on the viruses (other than the vaccine strains) to third
parties such as vaccine manufacturers. While discouraging
the use of material transfer agreements (MTAs) at the
point when donor countries transferred their virus samples
to the WHO, WHO’s collaborating centers nonetheless
resorted to MTAs when they transferred to third parties
vaccine strains containing parts of the viruses supplied by
developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam and
China. Indeed WHO’s collaborating centers themselves, as
well as third parties, had sought patents covering parts of
the source viruses used in developing vaccines and
diagnostics.19
Perhaps because of these revelations, twenty developing countries
entered a resolution to the World Health Assembly “calling for a new
international framework to be set up for the sharing of avian influenza
viruses, to review the existing WHO research system and to prioritize
the manufacture and availability of vaccines in developing countries.” 20
The goal of this resolution was to provide rights to those
19

Chan Chee Khoon, p.2.
Martin Khor, “Developing Countries Call for New Flu Virus Sharing System,” SouthNorth Development Monitor (SUNS) #6253, May 15, 2007. Accessed on February 2,
2011 at www.twnside.org.sg/title2/avianflu/news.stories/afns.006.htm
20
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countries that shared viral seed stock samples. From the perspective
of developing countries, they saw little benefit from sharing viral
samples with the World Health Organization. They perceived that these
samples were being shared improperly with companies that used them
to create vaccines for profit, which were then sold at prices far too high
for the developing world to purchase. For this reason, the resolution
stated that any “vaccines, diagnostics, anti-virals and other medical
supplies arising from the use of the virus and parts thereof must be
made available at an affordable price and in a timely manner to the
developing countries, particularly to those under the most serious
threat or already experiencing the pandemic threat.”21 This resolution
was opposed by the United States, which was particularly concerned
that changes to the “Material Transfer Agreements” (which governed
viral seed stock sharing) might undermine global collaboration to
produce vaccines against pandemic strains of the vaccine. In the end,
the World Health Assembly passed a resolution calling on the WHO to
create a vaccine stockpile, as well as “new terms of reference for the
sharing of influenza viruses.”22 Nonetheless, the WHA resolutions failed
to create a comprehensive framework to address these issues. Even
so, Indonesia has returned to sharing viral samples with the WHO, as
part of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN).23
21

Khor, p.3.
Chan Che Khoon.
23
For an excellent overview of this history see Rachel Irwin, “Indonesia, H5N1, and
Global Health Diplomacy,” Global Health Governance, 3:2, Spring 2010, accessed online on January 2, 2011 at www.ghgj.org.
22
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While developing nations –such as India, Thailand and Brazilsympathized with this position, there have been substantial critiques of
Indonesia’s position, both by developed states and international law
experts.24 One challenge for Indonesia is that viruses do not respect
borders. Because of this reality, how can they be considered an aspect
of biodiversity under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)? 25
The Indonesian precedent also seemed to threaten health in other
nations, which was prohibited by article three of the CBD.26 In other
words, the very convention that Indonesia was invoking to uphold its
position, appeared to prohibit Indonesia’s decision to withhold viral
seed stocks. Similarly, Kenan Mullis has argued not only that
Indonesia’s position likely violated article twelve of the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but also that the
means for its protest are too severe to be justified given the end that it
seeks to achieve.27 In sum, although Indonesia’s position attracted
much sympathy because it evoked the frustrations of many developing
countries, it stood on shaky legal ground.
As more information became available, it also became clear that
Indonesia’s position, at least initially, may have been focused on more
than bird flu alone. Indeed, it seemed that the WHO had managed to
address many of Supari’s immediate concerns in 2007:
24
25
26
27

For the nations supporting Indonesia’s position, see Elbe, 479.
Mullis, 955.
Mullis, 957.
Mullis, 958, 967
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. . .Supari also felt sufficiently emboldened to hold out for
more than just a few concessions made by the West, and
to push for a fundamental transformation of the virussharing mechanism. When, for example, she was
approached by the WHO with offers of a laboratory
upgrade and as much vaccine as they needed in February
2007, she turned these offers down. . . Rather than simply
accepting these offers of material support, and resolving
the dispute there and then, the Indonesian health minister
instead formulated a much stronger demand that made
Indonesia’s resumption of virus sharing conditional upon a
more fundamental reformation of the whole-virus-sharing
mechanism.28
From this perspective, the WHO appears to have made reasonable
accommodations to the concerns of Indonesia, but was rebuffed.
The 2009 Novel H1N1 Pandemic.
Despite numerous discussions in various forums, the global
health community had made little progress on this issue by the time of
the 2009 pandemic. During the crisis, poor nations could not access
vaccines: “Despite appeals to humanitarian solidarity and to
enlightened self-interest, almost all of the first billion doses of H1N1
vaccine produced in 2009 were allotted to 12 wealthy nations which

28

Elbe, 482.
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had made advance orders. Sanofi Pasteur and GlaxoSmithKline
pledged 120 million doses to the WHO for distribution to poor
countries, but even those pledges could be fulfilled only months after
the pandemic had waned.”29 In response, Laurie Garrett warned that
events seemed to be proving Supari’s fears.30 Other scholars have
wrestled with the ethical problems that this experience raised. Even
while the epidemic waned, developing countries remained uncertain if
they might receive unused vaccine from wealthy countries.31
It is true that the World Health Organization made a substantial
effort to push manufacturers and the developed world to make vaccine
available for developing nations. But it was clear that this could not be
the main tool to fight the epidemic, as Dr. Marie-Paule Kieny, the
director of the Initiative for Vaccine Research at the World Health
Organization stated in a 2009 interview:
Q: What happens if developing countries have only partial
coverage?
A: Coverage will be partial and not only in developed
countries. But we should not be “hypnotized” by vaccines.
There are other measures, such as social distancing, school
closure, avoidance of large gatherings, antibiotics and
personal hygiene. This is not a disease like rabies, which is
29

Khoon, p. 3.
Khoon, p.3.
31
Marcel Verweij, “Health Inequities in Times of a Pandemic,” Public Health Ethics,
2:3 (2009): 207-209.
30
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100% fatal: we are talking about a disease from which
most people recover very well.32
Dr. Marie-Paule Kieny also pointed out that the WHO had obtained
commitments for 150 million doses of vaccine for developing countries
from manufacturers, which was a major achievement. For developing
countries, nonetheless, the 2009 pandemic served to accentuate their
concerns that in the case of a truly lethal pandemic, they would be
largely relying on the same public health measures that had been used
during the 1918 pandemic. Of course, it was also true that this would
be the case for citizens in developed countries. But concerns about
global health equity remained, particularly in South-East Asia, which
was the front-line of the global effort to contain avian influenza.
The main reason that developing countries could not obtain
vaccine was the lack of production capacity and the existence of
advance contracts. But another challenge was that in 2009 the United
States government made the decision not to use adjuvants to stretch
the supply of vaccine. By using adjuvants, which are chemicals that
stimulate the immune systems’ response to an antigen, vaccine
manufacturers could make more vaccine available from existing
production facilities. But policy makers in the United States worried
that the public would not accept their use, despite the fact that Europe
has a long history of employing them.
32

Anonymous, “WHO Supports fair access to influenza A (H1N1) vaccine,” Bulletin of
the World Health Organization, 2009, 87: 654.
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In part, the U.S. decision may have reflected the political realities
after a now-discredited study by British physician Andrew Wakefield,
which suggested that there was a link between childhood vaccinations
and autism. Many years and millions of dollars were spent discrediting
this study, which was based on a small number (twelve) children, and
which also seems to have been based on fraudulent data, according to
an article in the British Medical Journal in 2011. Even though Wakefield
was discredited, however, popular fears about vaccines remained. This
likely shaped the U.S. government’s decision not to use adjuvants in
the novel H1N1 vaccine formulation. But this also meant that far more
vaccine stock would be needed, which decreased the amount of
vaccine that could be shared with developing countries. These nations
found themselves to be in the position of depending upon decisions in
the wealthy countries to receive vaccine. Fortunately, the pandemic
had a relatively low level of lethality.
The Current Standoff
While Indonesia’s position has moderated slightly since the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, the issue remains unresolved. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa, expressed the position of
developing countries during an interview on September 20, 2010,
during which Laurie Garrett called in to ask him about the concept of
viral sovereignty. He argued that work and resources from Indonesia
contributed greatly to the development of vaccines, but Indonesia and
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other poor countries had little chance of being able to benefit from
them: “And I think what our present administration is doing is precisely
striking a balance; how to ensure, on the one hand, we live up to our
international obligations; but, on the other hand, . . . how we must
make the issue of access to vaccines by developing countries a bit
more prominent in international discourse, in terms of making sure
that countries like Indonesia have –as a population within it, have
access to vaccines.”33
While Indonesia has continued to hold to its position, the position
of developed nations has also remained the same:
Western countries, on the other hand, feared the
human and economic impact of delayed detection of an
emerging influenza pandemic and wish to avoid the
precedent of acquiescing to `viral blackmail.’ The global
health community’s reaction to these events has been
split, because Indonesia’s actions are seen as undermining
global influenza surveillance, but also as a clarion call to
overturn long-standing inequities in the global
pharmaceutical market. Both Indonesia’s actions and the
various global actors’ responses have complex roots in
self-interest, and domestic and international politics.34
33

Transcript, “A Conversation with Marty Natalegwa, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia,” Council of Foreign Relations, September 20, 2010. Accessed
on January 31, 2011 from www.cfr.org/publication/22984/conversation_with _marty
34
Harley Feldbaum, Joshua Michaud, “Health Diplomacy and the Enduring Relevance
of Foreign Policy Interests,” PLoS Medicine, 7:4:
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Harley Feldbaum and Joshua Michaud have argued that developing
countries believe that the 2005 revisions of the International Health
Regulations were undertaken so as to reflect the interests of the most
powerful countries: “. . .the IHR were adopted because they served
powerful state interests, and accordingly some developing countries
view the IHR as an instrument of the foreign policy and national
security interests of developed countries seeking protection from
epidemics emanating abroad, and therefore as only an extension of
age-old power politics.”35 In short, there remain substantial concerns
within the developing world, both regarding the overall structure of
global health governance, as well as the independence of the World
Health Organization.
Confidence regarding the integrity of the World Health
Organization was further undermined in 2010, when Deborah Cohen
and Philip Carter published an article in the British Medical Journal,
which revealed that there serious conflicts of interest within the WHO.
Some committee members who recommended stockpiling medications
(Tamiflu and Relenza) and other measures to prepare for a pandemic
were revealed to have financial ties to the pharmaceutical companies
most likely to benefit from these measures. For the WHO’s critics, this
revelation created issues of transparency in the WHO’s policymaking
e1000226.doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000226, 7.
35
Feldbaum and Michaud, 7. For more information on IHRs see Lawrence O. Gostin,
“International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health Organization’s
International Health Regulations.” Journal of the American Medical Association, June
2, 2004, 291:21, 2626 (double check page number).
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process.36 In particular, they questioned the WHO’s decision to declare
the 2009 HIN1 outbreak a “pandemic” despite the relatively low
mortality rates. They also pointed to concerns about the political
influence held by industry-funded groups such as the European
Scientific Working Group on Influenza. Was the WHO too tightly
connected to major pharmaceutical corporations to create
disinterested health policy?
In a larger sense, most observers have agreed that the reason
that global health governance has not changed because the status quo
favors the interests of the most powerful nation-states. David Fidler
argued that a new framework for global health governance appeared
unlikely in 2010: “The prospects for such a framework are not,
however, promising, because the national interests of most developed
states vis-á-vis dangerous influenza strains favor retaining the existing
imbalanced, reactive, and ad-hoc approach to vaccine access.”37
Indonesian authors have made the same point: “Poor countries have
no bargaining position, because their participation in the production of
these products are not valued as they are `just’ natural resources
(clinical specimens, viruses, and other microbes); on the other hand
the industrialized countries’ contributions are highly valued because
36

Deborah Cohen, Philip Carter, “WHO and the Pandemic Flu `Conspiracies.’” British
Medical Journal, June 2010, 340: 2912.
37
David P. Fidler, “Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global Health
Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 and Pandemic
Influenza, H1N1.” PLoS Medicine. 7(5): e1000247.
Doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000247.
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they are human invented technology.”38
This perception might change rapidly in an avian flu pandemic
with greater lethality than its 1918 forerunner. In that case, would
countries Egypt or Indonesia share viral seed stocks in time to create
vaccines in the developed world? Or might they be tempted to
withhold stocks as a bargaining tool to obtain more vaccine? What
would be the international political costs if the U.S. did not choose to
use an adjuvant, which reduced vaccine supplies for other nations,
during a severe pandemic? The existing order seems tolerable only
because the international community has not faced a truly severe
public health crisis.
In the 1990s, HIV/AIDS came to be seen as a security issue,
because of the instability that the disease might foster in developing
countries.39 This argument was made from within a traditional, realist
security perspective. Within in the framework of human security, which
focuses primarily on threats to the individual rather than to the state,
influenza is clearly a preeminent security challenge, because few
dangers could cause such major casualties, short of nuclear warfare or
bioterrorism. From this viewpoint, influenza preparation is more than a
solely health concern, and merits substantial resources and attention
to address. In 2005 then Senator Barack Obama argued in the New
York Times that avian influenza posed a security threat to the United
38
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States.40 But there are dangers to securitizing health issues, as the
drug wars in Mexico and Colombia illustrate. If they defied the WHO,
would nations such as Indonesia be defined as rogue states in a new
international health order? Currently, the WHO has no enforcement
ability regarding International Health Regulations, which makes such
concerns appear unrealistic. But Stefan Elbe has made the argument
that it was precisely because avian flu was increasingly viewed in
terms of security that the standoff between the West and Indonesia
became so severe.41 This approach may seem attractive because of
both the resources and governmental attention that it can help to
bring to a problem.42 But if Elbe’s argument is correct, then the issue is
best dealt with as an issue of global health governance.
The Rise of Transnational Alliances
At the same time, global health raises larger issues that lead to
questions about the nation-state as the main actor in international
politics. Is the nation-state the best level of analysis for global health
problems? Niam Stephenson has argued that people no longer look
solely to the nation state for “rights and representation” but rather to
an array of other transnational actors. In the era of globalization,
questions of sovereignty and health create new perspectives on the
international order. Stephenson suggests that the WHO has been a
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weakening political actor because of decades-long trend in which it is
underfunded. As the WHO has worked to securitize health in order to
respond to international health challenges, new political actors are
becoming involved in these affairs, which he called “aggregates.”
These aggregates are alliances between varying actors –developing
countries and NGOs, the World Health Organization and
pharmaceutical companies- that mobilize around an ideology to
achieve their health objectives. Stephenson suggests that this
international order is shaped by neoliberal objectives, in particular the
need to ensure the unimpeded flow of trade goods, in a manner that
can conflict with health goals, such as the need for quarantine. In this
context, Stephenson suggests that nationalist rhetoric, such as that of
Supari, is employed to challenge transnational powers and the
neoliberal agenda. As such, Indonesia’s position represented more
than a challenge to influenza preparation. Developing countries fear
that pharmaceutical companies are driving global health policy, as a
new market for growth. But current influenza preparations often
exclude developing countries, by such means as advance contracts, as
the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 suggested. From this perspective,
Indonesia’s effort represented an alternative alliance for global health
policy –one between a developing country and a vaccine maker,
Baxter- rather than the existing “aggregate” between the WHO and
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global pharmaceutical corporations.43
Stephenson’s argument raises key questions. In what way does
the securitization of health discourse challenge existing ideas about
the nation-state, and what groups does it empower? When we discuss
health security, do we mean security for the individual or the state?
Why has sovereignty been at the core of these discussions, and which
entity has the right to assert authority over biological samples? Is the
concept of “aggregates” a useful one to understand the emerging
players in global health? To what extent do neoliberal economic ideals
shape current policy-making by health actors such as the WHO? And
perhaps most of all, who should people look to, in order to make
decisions for global health? In the long term, policy-making as part of
pandemic preparations will have to address these questions. At the
same time, in the short term there are also some practical, hard
questions to answer. What then, should global health actors, such as
the World Health Organization, do in the face of a pandemic?
Public Health Policy
Practical issues bedevil preparation efforts, particularly
concerning advance contracts for vaccines. Given current structures, if
all organizations and states act in a rational fashion, they may make
choices that could keep tens of millions of vaccine doses from use in a
43
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pandemic. A series of public health steps are needed to increase
confidence in the WHO, to respond to the demands of developing
countries for greater access to vaccines, and to ensure the continued
access of the WHO to viral seed stocks. Many authors have made
recommendations for improving the current situation, which the
following list builds upon:44
1. The Material Transfer Agreements used by the World Health
Organization should specify that if viral seed stocks are used by
a corporation to produce vaccines, then a portion of those
vaccines must supplied to the country of origin at a reasonable
price during a pandemic.
2. The World Health Organization should ensure that all people
involved in the formulation of health policy related to influenza
are not retained or employed by vaccine manufacturers or
pharmaceutical corporations that produce medications to treat
influenza.
3. The WHO should request that advance contracts for influenza
vaccine only be adopted only if the contract states share a
fraction of the vaccine produced with developing countries.
4. The WHO should request that developed countries should
dedicate a portion of foreign aid to supporting the stockpiling of
44
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medications and vaccines for influenza in the developing world.
In addition, the World Bank should prioritize loans to increase not
only vaccine production capability in developing countries, but
also their surveillance and reporting infrastructure. In some
countries, such as Brazil, the World Bank’s support created
dramatic changes in the efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. A targeted
effort could achieve the same with preparations for influenza.
5. Developed countries –in particular the United States- should
conduct research on adjuvants, to identify those that could be
used with confidence in a pandemic. These nations should
commit the use of adjuvants in a pandemic, in order to ensure
that vaccine supplies are stretched to the maximum extent
possible.
6. Developing nations should commit to sharing viral seed stocks
with the World Health Organization in as rapid a manner as
realistically possible, and to support the World Health
Organization’s International Health Regulations.
Conclusion
The global community has recently evaded a number of
disasters, such as the 2003 SARS pandemic, which was ultimately
contained, and the 2009 influenza pandemic, which proved to have a
relatively low mortality rate. Still, we cannot expect that we will
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continue to enjoy such good fortune. While issues of global health
equity may appear to be abstract questions, in a health crisis they
would rapidly escalate into diplomatic crises. For this reason, there is a
pressing need to resolve these questions before a crisis strikes. As
Stefan Elbe has argued, Indonesia’s protest has led to some changes:
“Already, the WHO has taken some steps to accommodate the
demands of Indonesia and other developing countries, including the
development of a system for tracking the movement of shared H5N1
virus samples, and exploring the feasibility of creating a stockpile of
vaccines that developing countries could draw on.”45 While these
technical steps are helpful, they do not address the larger questions
that influenza pandemics entail.
Part of the reason that this political dispute has been so difficult
is that it has challenged our existing assumptions about the global
order, which is predicated on the notion that nation-states are the key
political actors, which should act on a rational basis to defend their
national interests. The trouble with this assumption is two-fold. Global
health problems can only be addressed through collaboration, which is
unlikely to be achieved if the key actors are the nation-states alone.
Second, there are key transnational actors, in particular big
pharmaceutical companies and vaccine manufacturers, which are
global actors in their own right. These actors are capable of entering
45
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into commercial and research partnerships with both nation-states and
international organizations in a manner that can profoundly impact
individuals’ ability to access both vaccines and medicines. Stephenson
points also what has taken place with HIV/AIDS over the last decade,
during which huge amounts of money have been funneled by what he
calls “vertical actors,” such as the World Bank and non-governmental
organizations.46 In this context, health cannot be considered outside
the context of larger global political questions. Before the next crisis
comes, as it will, the global community needs to address not only the
technical questions that are entailed, but also the broader
philosophical issues, in order to create a new framework for pandemic
preparedness.
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